What was wrong with Cain’s sacrifice?

A reader may wonder: What was wrong with Cain’s sacrifice?

Professor Robert Alter writes that the biblical narrator used several techniques to convey meaning, e.g., statements by the anonymous narrator, by God, by heroes or heroines, by verbal clues, by juxtaposition of material, by characterization, and by effects of actions. Applying this technique, the verbal clues of the narrative can yield a number of interpretations that reveal the quality of Cain’s sacrifice. Some early rabbinic sources think Cain offered an inferior grade of sacrifice. Unlike his brother who offers the “firstlings of his flock,” Cain does not offer the “firstfruits” of his field. This could suggest that the rabbis may have indeed been correct in their scriptural observation.

This exposition would certainly be consistent with the prophetic message of sacrifices, e.g., the offering in sacrifice of a lame, sick, or blind animal is expressly forbidden in the Torah (Lev. 22:17-25; Deut. 17:1). However, it is  in the prophetic literature, this reason for this proscription becomes lucid and understandable.

“So says the LORD of hosts to you, O priests, who despise his name. But you ask,  ‘How have we despised your name?’  By offering polluted food on my altar! Then you ask,  ‘How have we polluted it?’ By saying the table of the LORD may be slighted!  When you offer a blind animal for sacrifice, is this not evil? When you offer the lame or the sick, is it not evil? Present it to your governor; see if he will accept it, or welcome you, says the LORD of hosts” (Malachai 1:6-8).

However, what if Cain’s sacrifice failed because of an entirely different reason–namely, his attitude?

Here too, Philo’s exposition may shed some light.  According to him, a bad person’s offering will never be considered a “true sacrifice,” for “even if he were to bring the altar ten thousand oxen every day without intermission; for his most important and indispensable offering, namely his soul, is polluted. And it is impious for polluted things to come near to the altar.” In other words, the worshiper’s attitude is even more important than what the actual sacrifice, which may be physically fine. Philo of Alexandria seems to be suggesting that so long as the heart and soul of the worshiper remains tinged with selfishness and pride, these kinds of moral imperfections will mar the beauty of any offering that is brought to the altar of God.

Maimonides’s View on Sacrifices

Despite some ambivalence Maimonides felt about the institution of animal sacrifices,  the great Jewish philosopher argues that animal sacrifice can reflect a noble impulse that pushes one to give one’s very best in areas that go far beyond the cultic sector.

For example, Maimonides considers Abel’s sacrifice as a paradigm for all types of voluntary charitable giving. Every sacrifice must be given as an act of love and devotion; indeed, the absence of these qualities invalidates and cheapens the religious experience. Without the cultivation of the giving spirit, no virtue is possible. Although this is not a strict requirement in the legalistic sense, nevertheless the one who is truly concerned about becoming close to God must go beyond mere perfunctory worship. Maimonides writes:

Anyone wishing to become personally worthy of merit should overcome the urge toward selfishness and make it a point to always offer one’s best and finest, so that his offering will be most exemplary. The Torah says: “and Abel for his part brought of the firstlings of his flock, their fat portions” (Gen. 4:4). The same rule ought to apply to every kind of offering: whatever one gives should come from the finest and very best. The house of prayer that one builds must be nicer than one’s own personal dwelling; the same spiritual principle ought to be applied to other areas of one’s devotional life, e.g., with respect to the poor, one feeds the hungry with one’s very best and tasty foods on one’s table; the naked should be clothed with very finest of one’s wardrobe, and one should always dedicate the very best of all one’s possessions—even as the Torah states, “All fat belongs to the Lord” (Lev. 3:16). [1]

For Maimonides, God’s choice of Abel’s sacrifice was not based at all on what each person offered, but was instead predicated on the motive of the participants. In other words, the central issue that is raised in the story of Cain and Abel story was not so much about the quality of the sacrifice as it was about the personality of the one offering the sacrifice. Cain and Abel represent the distinction between selfless worship and selfish worship. From Cain’s sacrifice, the reader may discern how even spiritual worship can degenerate into an act that is perfunctory in purpose and in scope. Toward the end of Maimonides’s life, he focused considerable attention on this specific theme. Maimonides felt that Cain’s sacrifice failed because he was miserly in his giving; he withheld his best. He writes:

He has ordained that all the offerings be perfect in the most excellent condition, in order that the sacrifice should not come to be held in little esteem and that what was offered to His name, may He be exalted, be not despised, as it is written “‘When you bring blind animals for sacrifice, is that not wrong? When you sacrifice crippled or diseased animals, is that not wrong? Try offering them to your governor! Would he be pleased with you? Would he accept you?’ says the Lord Almighty” (Mal. 1:8).[2]


[1] Guide to the Perplexed 3:46.

[2]Guide to the Perplexed 3:46.

When Speaking of the Ineffable

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When Speaking of the Ineffable

Like Philo of Alexandria over a millennium before him, Maimonides boldly asserts that the negative attributes of God represent the true attributes.[1] Thus, when we say that “God exists,” that means to say that He is not nonexistent; when we say that “God is wise,” that is another way of saying that God is not foolish. When we describe “God is knowing’” that is another way of saying that God is not ignorant, hearing and seeing excludes ignorance, and so on; in no way is God ever circumscribed by the qualities that mortals project unto Him. This approach is sometimes called the via negativa (“the way of negation”). Maimonides regards all Biblical predicates about the personality of God as homonyms, i.e., when speaking about God, all anthropomorphic descriptions connote an entirely different reality than is commonly assumed.

Maimonides writes that we cannot know anything about God per se; God’s essential character is completely incomprehensible to mortal minds. Human beings at best can only describe what God does in the world but will never be able to discern what God is.[2] In all likelihood, Maimonides would have agreed with Otto’s language that God is “wholly other,” in that the Holy utterly transcends the bounds of human reason. Maimonides concurs, for him, God cannot be categorized by human thought per se. The way we represent God to ourselves cannot adequately describe the nature of the Divine reality. Maimonides’s”negative theology” emphasizes the discontinuity between God and the world, Though God’s Presence (Shekhina) is intimately and organically related to the cosmos, God is also sovereign over the world. “If the Heavens cannot contain You” (1 Kings 8:27), how much less can philosophical categories hope to represent the nature of the Divine continuum! According to negative theology, every idea—however lofty and spiritual—nevertheless remains a mental picture and thus limiting. Without it, God becomes a creature of the human imagination. Maimonides warns his readers about the dangers of defining God in any image or metaphor.[3] All positive affirmations of God when pushed to the limit must always bow in silence before God’s mysterious nature and being. Maimonides recalls a Talmudic story about how once the rabbis heard a man praying: Continue reading “When Speaking of the Ineffable”